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Abstract 
Today, the world economy is at the brink of a major recession at zero lower bound. 
The recession has been fomented by the underconsumption induced by (i) the 
increasing income inequality, which is inherent in the neoliberal policymaking 
followed the last third of a century, and (ii) the declining wages being brought about 
by the increasing globalization and hence, international competition. And, the zero 
lower bound has been the aftermath of continuous interest rate reductions to confront 
the latent recessionary trends by stimulating investment but by increasing at the same 
time the prices of assets, bonds, and housing inciting several kinds of “bubbles” and 
inhibiting investment. The policy of “quantitative easing” in the place of interest rate 
reductions, a surrogate only of the latter has proved to be so far, for the simple reason 
that the money injections involved to spur business and household demand, are 
channeled towards the banking system, which withholds and does not pass on the 
money to the public. A money gift policy in the sense of transferring money directly 
to the public as a permanent asset for the private sector but not liability for the public 
sector, activating subsequently the Pigou effect, is advocated herein to be a viable 
policy alternative out of the current deadlock, ceteris paribus.  
Keywords: Global recession, Underconsumption, Zero lower bound, Quantitative 
easing, Money gift/rain 
1. Introduction 
The concept of liquidity trap, which today is attributed with the term Zero 
Lower Bound (ZLB), refers to the infinite elasticity of money demand at zero or so 
nominal interest rate under recession conditions. Households want to hold only money 
and not assets, to buy the goods and services recession has taken away from them. 
And, this problem of insufficient demand is an equilibrium state of affairs, because 
underconsumption causes pessimism on the part of investors. Pessimism, deterring 
them to invest and help recovery by borrowing from banks that are reluctant to lend 
anyway, because of the low interest rate and low thereby return to lending.  
Under this investor-bank “non-interaction”, channeling cash into the market 
indirectly though the banking system as is typically done by the Central Bank would 
only change the circulation velocity, leaving unaffected the real economy: Monetary 
policy is completely ineffective. So, many economists believe that the best way to end 
a liquidity trap is a money gift directly to households, to be spent à la Pigou effect and 
spur subsequently investment. This is a special case of economic policy since it can 
be classified as both monetary and fiscal, and does not form part of the statutory 
responsibilities of a Central Bank. 
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Figure 1: The Course of the Interest Rate: Source: 
www.tradingeconomics.com 
The concept of liquidity trap is intertwined with the Great Crash of 1929, 
while Figure 1 shows that all major economies today operate in an environment of 
ZLB although not as serious as in the Great Crash. For example, it is noteworthy that 
although the very low interest rates in the US and UK increased profits there by 5% in 
2012, investment remained stagnant, due presumably to the uncertainty surrounding 
the prospects for economic recovery, and to stricter lending requirements. At the same 
time, $630 billion in net interest income was lost together by households in these 
countries though the loss might have been mitigated by increased asset prices. 
Anyway, as first pointed out by Governor Ben Bernanke of the US Federal 
Reserve (Fed), the policy of money gift or “money rain” or “helicopter money” is the 
only solution to the current global recession. John Maynard Keynes proposed burying 
bottles of banknotes in old coal mines, that when excavated (like gold), the cash found 
would act as new wealth, stimulating demand through the Pigou effect. And, Milton 
Friedman (1969, p. 4) too, acknowledged the attractiveness of the direct transfer of 
money to households, comparing it to a helicopter drop of money. This policy is 
feared to be inflationary, but Figure 2 shows that under the present at least 
circumstances these fears are groundless. The movements in money supply in the 
eurozone of 17 do not seem to be linked to the course of prices and this, for the trends 
in recent economic history, which are discussed in the next section and make the 
exercise of a money gift policy imperative at least today. The third section concludes 
this tract with further remarks on the subject.
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2. Recession and Policy 
The central idea behind the neoliberal restrictive monetary policy, with public 
sector restructuring and tax cuts, which was launched in the 1980s primarily in the 
USA, UK and Germany against stagflation was (a) the favorable treatment of capital 
to boost growth, and (b) the widening economic inequality to reduce consumption and 
therefore restraint inflation (see e.g. Gills 2011). And, indeed, this program succeeded 
so much that the basic principles of the advancement of the euro area in 1998-9 were 
based on it. Just  
                                                     
1
 A recent theoretical and empirical discussion of recession as a general equilibrium phenomenon is 
provided by Gonchar et al. (2015). The discussion herein might be viewed as one of broader political 
economy considerations, including policy recommendations. 
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Figure 2: Money Supply and Inflation: Source: research.stlouisfed.org 
then, around 2000, began to manifest themselves the recessionary tendencies inherent 
in underconsumption (see e.g. Cripps et al. 2011), and it seemed that this trend had to 
be confronted by reducing interest rates initially and later and until today by 
quantitative easing (QE).  
The decrease in rates shown in Figure 1, was supposed to make investment 
cheaper but simultaneously increased the prices of stock, bonds, and housing, 
resulting in stock and housing market bubbles, which in turn discouraged the 
investments that the reduction of interest rates was aiming in the first place. And of 
course the problem of inequality could not be addressed in the context of 
neoliberalism − of enhancing the role of the private sector by making the rich richer 
to invest more − becoming subsequently worse, increasing underconsumption even 
more. Undrconsumption that was strengthened by the declining wages brought about 
by the increased competition accompanying the expansion of globalism. The result 
was the postponement of the recession. As, for example, Irwin (2014) reports for the 
United States, GDP is still well below its potential, and there is nothing extraordinary 
in job growth. 
When Bernanke spoke of the money gift policy, it was the 2002, foreseeing 
the impasse that would result from an interest rate policy, which was launched by the 
Governor of the Fed, Alan Greenspan. But when he took over the Fed he chose policy 
of QE via the purchase of government bonds, which of course is an open market 
operations policy. He chose to inject cash in the economy through the banking system 
and not directly to the household. Yet, banks chose in turn not to channel this money 
to the public but “play” with it and preserve the risks for financial bubbles. From this 
point of view, QE is just a different way of obtaining the same goal that the interest-
rate reduction policy had, which policy, as Figure 1 shows, was never abandoned.  
Thus, the bubbles were not avoided with greater that of Lehman Brothers in 
2008-9, the income inequality was widened so much that “today’s [wealth-to-income] 
ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries (600–700%)” (Piketty and Zucman 2014, p. 1255), the 
underconsumption is what has been keeping prices constant whereas their increase 
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would strengthen production incentives and corroborate growth, and the problem 
generally of stimulating demand has become as urgent to address as ever. 
Consequently, anything else than effective the QE announced by President Mario 
Draghi of the European Central Bank (ECB) is expected to be with regard to 
eurozone. The reduction in interest rates and quantitative easing only short-term 
results may have, simply postponing the onset of recession. 
As Dobbs et al. (2013) put it: “There is widespread consensus that the 
conventional and unconventional monetary policies that world’s major central banks 
implemented … prevented a deeper recession and higher unemployment than there 
otherwise would have been. These measures, along with a lack of demand for credit 
as a result of the recession, contributed to a decline in real and nominal interest rates 
to ultra-low levels that have been sustained over the past five years.” 
Many, including Bernanke and Draghi apparently, consider QE as a way of 
helicopter money drop. This is true to the extent that the public sees this money as a 
net increase in the present value of its wealth given the consolidated private and 
public sector budgets intertemporally; intertemporally, because the household should 
not be expecting a cancelation of the money gift in some future time. Only then the 
helicopter money will be an asset for the private sector, without being a liability for 
the public sector, permanently, inciting subsequently the operation of the Pigou effect 
(Buiter 2005, 2014).  
Therefore, the failure of QE as a form of money gift and hence, as a means of 
stimulating demand through the Pigou effect, should be attributed to the behavior of 
the banking system as the recipient of the gift that did not pass it on to its customers, 
arriving as a consequence at today’s ZLB. Lowering the interest rate to attract 
investment unjustifiable by underconsumption anyway, is lowering at the same time 
the profitability of lending and it is “natural” to be redirecting excess bank liquidity to 
“playing” in the financial markets. The risk of bank failures is thereby increased, 
necessitating the introduction of own-capital regulation to minimize potential bank-
failure induced bank runs. The increasing emphasis on such regulation is the outcome 
of this precisely sequence of events. QE only strengthens excess liquidity, 
exacerbating the problem. And, regarding the Eurozone which just now launched the 
QE punishing with negative interest rate banks that deposit money in the ECB instead 
of distributing it to the public, this does not mean that banks will use the money as 
prescribed and not use them in another way
2
. 
Meaningful is only the original concept of helicopter money, i.e. a direct 
transfer of money to the public as net wealth, bypassing the banking system. Only 
then a ZLB can be avoided independently of the origin of underconsumption, which 
today is neoliberalism and globalization. Banks could be instructed for example to 
increase by some amount the bank account balance of those who do not belong to the 
richest 20% of the population, with the condition to spend this amount for some 
categories of goods and services supporting growth, as proposed by Blyth and 
Lonergan (2014), and with the type of expenditure being monitored through debit 
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Note that QE is one only method of conducting expansionary monetary policy and so, such a policy 
should not be identified always with QE. For example, the 2
nd
 May 2013 cut of the main interest rate to 
0.5% (down from 0.75%) by ECB and the extension of the term of its cheap loans to banks until at 
least 2014 to increase the quantity of money and the supply of loanable funds, are taken by some to be 
a form of QE. But, this is not the case. QE is as defined by Bernanke. 
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cards issued for that amount, might be added. Conceptually, institutionally, and 
practically, such a policy is neither monetary nor fiscal, but the monetary part of the 
intergenerational public finance (Buiter 2005).  
3. Further Remarks 
These issues were not raised for the Eurozone as pressing as in the US and 
other OECD countries in 2000, because of the good performance of the German 
economy and international confidence in the German warranty of the new euro. Yet, 
the Lehman crisis in 2008-9 revealed not only latent recessionary tendencies but also 
the friability of the economy in the South of the Eurozone, which now makes the 
eurozone crisis far worse than elsewhere. Draghi’s QE only temporary relief can 
provide; much more so when any QE now has to be exercised in view of a global 
debt, which according to International Monetary Funds’ (IMF) 2014 World Economic 
Outlook, has grown by $57 trillion since 2007, having raised the ratio of debt to GDP 
by 17 percentage points. This is why the call for a genuine money gift policy becomes 
every day and stronger not only for the US and EU, but for OECD and the whole 
world in general.  
For example, for Greece, which is the weaker link of Eurozone, such a policy 
may prove to be a panacea either inside or outside the euro area according at least to 
this author’s opinion. It is estimated that the debt burdening each person in that 
country is now 30000 euro. Given a balanced government budget and unchanged 
wage structure, a money gift of 20000 euro to each of them through debit cards 
distributed by the tax authority, would produce the 30000 euro debt after the period 
required to have the full effect of a multiplier equal to 1.5, ceteris paribus.
3
 Moreover, 
the country would enter this way a growth phase with the minimum reliance on its ill 
banking system, leaving it at the same time room to restructure towards more 
efficiency.  
Anyway, globalization may be a natural more or less trend of the world 
economy, but neoliberalism is not. The strengthening of the role of the private sector 
by favoring the rich confers also to them the political power needed to resist against 
any policymaking that would hurt their interests, turning subsequently neoliberalism 
into a regime. This is the heart of the problem of fighting underconsumption 
nowadays, namely that insufficient demand has to be confronted policy-wise within 
the context of the regime and not on purely economic grounds. A money gift policy 
has become necessary as a surrogate of an openly expansive fiscal policy, in a self-
financing though way as proposed e.g. by DeLong and Summers (2012). Such a 
policy would not hurt the interests of the private sector, but the term and only “fiscal” 
has become politically anguishing (see e.g. Blyth and Lonergan 2014).  
Acknowledgement: I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for useful comments; 
any remaining errors are my own. 
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